At the Roots of the Right, Anders Behring Breivik By Francis Martens, translated into English by Jonathan House.
If the second group changed their minds, the first psychiatric experts who examined Anders Breivik Behring diagnosed “paranoid schizophrenia” and therefore concluded he was not responsible for his acts. Their diagnosis was based on the use of neologisms in his political manifesto * neologisms are a common symptom in this type of psychopathology which is characterized by distortions of communication.
But the terms in question actually come from the vocabulary and the political culture of the far right * the term “national Darwinist”, for instance, is common in that movement. If the “experts” proved their ignorance of discourse and the thinking of the far right, this is not the case for Breivik. His contacts with this milieu are acknowledged, for example, his contact with the English Defence League, a nationalist group organized around fighting against Islam.
Shortly before his actions, he took care to inform those he considers his ideological family of the meaning of his combat. That is why his manifesto landed in the email inbox of a member of Vlaams Belang. After the killings, extremist groups have backed away. To a reporter who pointed out that Breivik wrote the same thing as Filip Dewinter (the leader of Vlaams Belang), Dewinter replied, “No, his struggle is not mine. My weapon is the mailbox, his weapon a gun. The difference could not be more fundamental” (Het Laatste Nieuws, July 26, 2011). One could have one*s doubts about this: it is clear that the writing of Mein Kampf (1925) is no alien to the atrocities of “Kristallnacht” (1938).
Apparently split off from his own emotions and not capable of empathy, Anders Breivik Behring is not a model of maturity. Yet it would be wrong to take him for a fool. In fact, his epic bloodbath fits perfectly into the radicalism of the right. Specifically, Breivik is the very prototype of the *schmittien* hero. To clarify this abrupt and enigmatic assertion, it is obviously necessary to remember Carl Schmitt (1888-1985).
Renowned theorist of law and legal adviser to the Nazi Party, this thinker (who remains a key reference for many ideologues) actually evolved in the same mental universe as that of the Norwegian killer. His political philosophy is essentially based on the social concept of “friend” and “enemy” (Der Begriff of politischen, 1932). According to Schmitt, the notion of ‘the political’ subsumes that of “the state”. Indeed, the latter is always only a particular implementation of the political whose specific function, regardless of its structure, is to assure the “distinction of friend from enemy”. Ultimately, power rests in the hands of those who designate the enemies and concretely, in the hands those who may direct someone to go kill another while putting his own life in danger. “In the extreme situation where there is serious dispute,” says Schmitt, “the decision falls to adversaries involved in the conflict; importantly, each of them is the only one who can decide if, in the concrete case of a specific conflict, the otherness of the foreigner represents the negation of his own form of existence, and therefore if the purposes of defense or of combat are to preserve the way of life consistent with his *being**. Note that at the same time, his compatriot, the philosopher Martin Heidegger, says the same thing (Vom Wesen der Wahrheit, 1933-34).
One suspects that this distinction * vital because “being” itself is at stake * becomes a problem when it comes to designating the enemy within, those who (as were the German Jews) are protected in principle by the same laws as those whose tranquility of identity they threaten. In a state of emergency, the government no longer follows legal rules that protect all citizens; “laws of exception” are proclaimed (which was the case not only under Hitler but also under Petain). Although they may be too weak to achieve it, the most resolute among citizens attempt a coup d**tat or else a explosive public act to solve the problem for themselves. This is exactly what Anders Breivik Behring did. Next to the game console on which he tirelessly identified with the warriors in Call of Duty (Modern Warfare #2), we can imagine that he kept on his nightstand the complete works of Carl Schmitt. For Schmitt the political extends far beyond constitutional rights; one must not confuse or conflate legality and legitimacy. For the Nazi jurist, the legitimacy of placing Jews outside the law. For Breivik, that of fighting the Islamic danger.
Psychologically, the Schmitt*s diary (Glossarium, 1947-1951) revealed a morbid suspicious personality as well as a delusional anti-Semitism. The writing itself had the merit of clarity and the appearance of common sense. It is true that a group will not survive long if it is unable to identify its enemies. This is why – to give an explanation for our unlikely survival – that in the social sciences we pursh our thinking a little further than Schmitt and Breivik. Thus Edward Tylor, one of the founders of social anthropology, who succinctly characterizes the dilemma of the earliest human societies, organized on the precarious mode of small, self-regulating clans: either go “outside the clan and get killed” or make an alliance by “marrying outside” (Primitive Culture, 1871). In this vein, Claude Levi-Strauss brings to the infinite anthology of traditional marriage systems an almost mathematical rigor of structures of exchange (Les structures *l*mentaires de la parent*, 1949). More radically, he defines “human society” as a system of alliance and cooperation based on exchange secured by reciprocity. In practice, the ethic of solidarity leads to a polity based on seeking alliances rather than on the paranoid designation of enemies. This is not a na*ve system, because it is precisely the danger of the world and the precariousness of the human species that leads to the choice of cooperation. In view of game theory, it turns out that this is also the best strategy (Robert Axelrod, The evolution of cooperation, 1984).
To designate enemies or to promote alliances, that is the radical opposition between the sensibilities of “right” and “left”. But, if they are embodied in political movements, their cleavage falls first in the heart of each singular existence. Sometimes paralyzed by fear of the other, sometimes mobilized by the need to lean on the other, the human being is scarred ambivalence. The fragility of the body, the small anchor of identity, make the bed of Breivik*s xenophobia. In times of material precariousness, wobbly cultural references and weakening of the rule of law, the fear of otherness (felt both as too close, too similar and also as competing) as well as that of “traitors” to the nation can lead to a preventative extermination. Breivik, from his point of view, did nothing but protect “being Norwegian” from a fatal stranglehold by Islam. That why, without being a monster, he shows no remorse. However, the discourse of identity that fueled this Schmittien hero surrounds us on all sides. Without questioning, the drift of the neoliberal world excels at creating scapegoats. The veil, halal meat etc. are invoked. Just like the Jew of the thirties, the “Arab” sees himself summoned to prove his innocence.
In humans * it is better to know it – nothing is more normal and simultaneously more destructive than xenophobia. In the global village – if we are to survive – we have no choice but solidarity.
Francis MARTENS (Psychologue Pr*sident de l*Association des psychologues praticiens d*orientation psychanalytique)
Click here to Read: Aux racines de la droite, Anders Behring Breivik, Francis Martens on the lalibre.be website on April 25, 2012. This article is the original French version of the article above.